In this paper, we report the case of DrO, a patient who has been described as having a selective problem understanding the meaning of abstract words in the auditory modality. We test this claim by means of an on-line semantic priming task, comparing the automatic activation of semantic information in both the auditory and visual modalities. Although DrO showed priming for both abstract and concrete words in the visual modality, there was only priming for concrete words in the auditory modality. However, DrO's reaction times (RTs) and errors in the auditory priming study suggested that he might have a generalised auditory processing impairment. We tested and confirmed this hypothesis in a series of further studies. We propose an account of why a general auditory processing impairment would affect abstract words more than concrete words by appealing to an auditory analogue of Plaut and Shallice's (1993) recent computational model of deep dyslexia.
INTRODUCTION
In the field of cognitive neuropsychology there is currently a lively debate focusing around the interpretation of category-specific deficits. These are deficits that appear to involve one type of information selectively while sparing others. Patients have been reported, for example, who have selective deficits in problems with abstract words 1 in either the auditory or visual modalities (Coltheart, Patterson, & Marshall, 1980; Franklin, 1989; Franklin, Howard, & Patterson, 1994) , and a smaller number have been described whohave problems in both modalities. This pattern is an extreme form of what is seen in experiments on unimpaired subjects. For example, lexical decision responses are slower to abstract than concrete words (James, 1975; Kroll & Merves, 1986) , and concrete words tend to be remembered better than abstract words (see Paivio, 1991 , for a review).
There have been various attempts to account for this pattern in normal subjects. Paivio (1971) has proposed that the difference between abstract and concrete words stems from the different ways in which they are encoded in memory. Concrete words are represented in both a verbal (logogen) and a nonverbal (imagen) code, whereas abstract words are represented in only a verbal code (see also Bleasdale, 1987) . Schwanenflugel (1991) has claimed that the difference rests on the fact that it is more difficult to integrate the meaning of an abstract word with real world knowledge. This is related to the claim that abstract words have less of a "core" meaning than concrete words, and thus are more flexible in terms of the way in which their meaning is affected by the context in which they occur (Saffran, Bogyo, Schwartz, & Marin, 1980) . Another view, proposed by Jones (1985) , is that abstract and concrete words vary in their ease-of-predication, with more predicates being generated for highly imageable (or concrete) words. This makes it easier to generate the semantic attributes of concrete than abstract words.
In the neuropsychological literature, the difference between abstract and concrete words has usually been interpreted interms of the traditional categoryspecific account with accompanying assumptions about underlying functional separation, as outlined earlier. This claim has gained support from the finding of a double dissociation for abstract and concrete words. There are a few reported cases of patients who show the reverse of the usual pattern of impairment; i.e. they have more problems with concrete than abstract words (e.g. Breedin, Saffran, & Coslett, 1994; Warrington, 1975 Warrington, , 1981 Warrington & Shallice, 1984) . Thus, patients who have a central semantic deficit for either abstract or concrete words are assumed to have a type of category-specific deficit.
Recently, however, Plaut and Shallice (1993) have argued that abstract and concrete word deficits can be obtained when there are no principled qualitative differences between the two word-types, thus undermining the claim for their separate representation in semantic memory. They have described a computa-tional model, designed to account for the symptoms of deep dyslexia, which can produce both abstract and concrete word deficits within a single system. The differences between abstract and concrete words are based on number of semantic features, with abstract words tending to have fewer features than concrete words. Number of features is taken to reflect the consistency with which specific semantic information is activated when a word is encountered; concrete words activate a more stable and consistent representation than abstract words. The hypothesis that the meaning of abstract words is considered to be more context-dependent than the meaning of concrete words is reflected in the fact that fewer semantic features are consistently activated when an abstract word is encountered.
In this model, damage to the semantic clean-up pathways leads to a deficit for concrete words, whereas damage to the direct pathways from input orthography to semantics results in a deficit for abstract words. Whether or not this model turns out, in the end, to provide the appropriate explanation for abstract and concrete word deficits, it at least demonstrates how these selective impairments can be obtained without assuming that the two types of words are represented in a qualitatively different fashion.
Modality-specific Impairment for Abstract Words
Most of the patients who have been reported as having a modality-specific impairment for abstract words have been deep dyslexics (Coltheart, Patterson, & Marshall, 1980 ) who have problems reading them. Patients with analogous difficulties confined to the auditory modality are much rarer (Franklin, Turner, et al., 1994; Martin & Saffran, 1992) . Recently, Franklin, Turner, et al. (1994) have reported a patient who they claim has a selective deficit for abstract words in the auditory but not visual modality. They point out that since the patient (DrO) is able to access the meaning of an abstract word from written input, the meaning representations of abstract words cannot be impaired; thus, the problem must be one of impaired access. They also claim that DrO's problems with abstract words cannot be due to a general auditory processing problem, since his repetition of single words is normal. They attribute his deficit to problems in the mapping from an intact phonological representation to an intact semantic representation. Franklin, Turner, et al. (1994) have carried out extensive studies with DrO, and provide a rich database upon which to evaluate the nature of his deficit. However, these studies rely almost exclusively on "off-line" tasks; that is, tasks like word-picture matching and semantic judgements, which include a conscious, metalinguistic aspect (Tyler, 1988 (Tyler, , 1992 . Such tasks tend to overestimate the extent to which a patient is impaired (Moss, Tyler, Hodges, & Patterson, 1995; Tyler, 1992) . Thus, poor performance on an off-line task does not necessarily mean that the patient has either degraded semantic repre-sentations or that access to intact representations is impaired. To address issues of access and representation more directly, we need to use implicit, or "on-line" tasks in which there is a more direct relationship between underlying representations and processes and task performance Tyler, 1992) .
Another important advantage of on-line tasks, where subjects produce a timed response to a spoken stimulus, is that they take into account one of the fundamental aspects of spoken language-its temporal properties. Because of the close temporal relationship between the speech input and the subject's response, on-line tasks provide a more direct window on the moment-bymoment processing of the speech input and are more suitable for addressing questions about the basic properties of lexical processing. To determine whether a patient has impaired or intact auditory processing, we need to be able to probe the time-course with which the speech input is analysed. It is difficult to determine conclusively that a patient does not have an auditory processing deficit using tasks which do not take this factor into account. For example, if lexical processing is tested by using an untimed lexical decision task, the number of errors a patient makes is usually the only measure of intact or impaired processing. But this is often a quite insensitive measure. There are many ways inwhich themapping fromspeech input tomeaning canbe impaired and slowed down without necessarily generating lexical decision errors in untimed tasks. Therefore, it is important to probe the time-course of lexical access in order to determine whether or not a patient has problems with any of the processes involved in recognising spoken words.
For these reasons we tested DrO on an on-line task-a semantic priming task-with both abstract and concrete words, to determine whether his difficulty with spoken abstract words involved an impairment in the rapid, automatic access to abstract word meanings in the auditory modality. In the version of the task we use, subjects hear pairs of words and make a timed lexical decision to the second member of the pair 2 . The advantage of the task is that it picks up the immediate, automatic activation of semantic information, and minimises the influence of later strategic, metalinguistic processes (see Moss, Ostrin, et al., 1995) . The semantic priming task has been used extensively to study semantic impairments in brain-damaged patients (Milberg & Blumstein, 1981; Milberg, Blumstein, Katz, Gershberg, & Brown, 1995; Ostrin & Tyler, 1993; Tyler, Moss, & Jennings, 1995) . Although the priming task is not without its problems (see Rapp & Caramazza, 1993) , there is now a significant body of data showing that it is a useful tool for studying the nature 2 Shelton and Martin (1992) have argued that this version of the priming task suffers from strategic influences and does not pick up the automatic activation of semantic information. However, we have argued against this in some detail elsewhere (Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, 1995) .
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of semantic representations and the processes involved in the automatic access to those representations, in both normal and language-impaired populations 3 . A significant advantage of the priming task is that it provides us with a particularly rich source of data. First, we obtain priming effects; these are the differences between lexical decision reaction times (RTs) in the semantically related (broom-floor) and unrelated (book-floor) conditions. If RTs are significantly faster in the related compared to the unrelated conditions, we can argue that semantic information has been rapidly activated and has facilitated identification of the target word. Second, we can see whether the magnitude of priming effects differs in the various experimental conditions. Third, we can look at the overall RT to see whether a patient's speed of responding is within the normal range. Fourth, we obtain lexical decision error data. If patients produce very slow lexical decision RTs and more errors than normal, whether or not they show significant priming effects, we may want to argue that they are not processing spoken words normally.
We compared DrO's ability to access word meanings automatically from the speech input with written input by testing him on an analogous visual priming experiment, using the same words as in the auditory priming study. We followed up the results of the priming studies with a series of studies designed to investigate further aspects of DrO's ability to process spoken words.
DrO
DrO was born in Norway in 1931. He moved to America in 1937 and since then has always lived in an English-speaking country. As an adult, he has rarely spoken Norwegian.
At the age of 60, in 1991, he suffered a CVA while going to the funeral of a friend who had suffered a stroke. Immediately afterwards, a speech therapist who saw him described his speech as being fluent with jargon and his comprehension as severely impaired. Dr S. Franklin of York University started testing him at the end of 1992. By that time his speech output had improved considerably; his speech was fluent and he had mild word-finding problems. A CAT scan performed soon after his stroke revealed a middle cerebral infarct.
Dr Franklin generously allowed us to start testing him in April 1994. We initially carried out an audiogram and found that he did not have a severe hearing impairment (17.5 db loss across left and right ears).
AUTOMATIC ACCESS TO SEMANTIC REPRESENTATIONS Auditory Semantic Priming Study
The question we asked in the first experiment was whether DrO would show the same pattern in the priming study as in the off-line studies reported by Franklin, Turner, et al. (1994) . If he has a selective impairment for abstract words in the auditory modality, then abstract words should prime significantly less than concrete words or not at all. Significant priming for both abstract and concrete words would suggest that the automatic activation of the meaning of abstract words is unimpaired, and that his difficulties with abstract words is confined to those off-line tasks that require conscious, metalinguistic processing.
We designed a semantic priming study, consisting of word-pairs where the subject had to make a lexical decision to the second member of the pair. The word-pairs were either abstract or concrete, and they were either both semantically related and normatively associated or just semantically related. All of the words were morphologically simple in order to avoid confounding morphological complexity with imageability 4 .
Materials
Pre-test: Semantic Relatedness Judgements. The pairs of words for the priming study had to be semantically related. To establish degree of semantic relatedness we carried out a pre-test with a large set of potential word-pairs, which subjects were asked to rate. Our initial set for the pre-test consisted of pairs of abstract synonyms 5 (e.g. value-worth) and pairs of concrete synonyms (e.g. boat-ship). All of the words were morphologically simple. Some of the abstract synonyms were highly associated ( > 20 forwards association) and others had low association values ( < 7 forwards and < 10 backwards) 6 . Similarly, some of the concrete pairs were highly associated (using the same criteria as for the abstract words) and others were nonassociated. These pairs were 4 Morphological complexity has been a majorconfoundin many previous studies, with abstract words tending to be morphologically complex (e.g. supplication) and concrete words tending to be morphologically simple. Since there may beprocessing consequences of encountering complex words (Marslen-Wilson, Tyler, Waksler, & Older, 1994) , and aphasic patients tend to have more problems with complex compared to simple words (Tyler, 1992; Tyler & Ostrin, 1994) , it was imperative to hold morphological complexity constant across theabstract andconcrete conditions. 5 Values on the abstract/concrete variable for each item were obtained mostly from existing norms (Coltheart, 1981) . In a few cases, the words were not contained in the norms, and we had to run our own pre-tests in our laboratory. 6 Associationvalues were obtained from previous association norms collected inourlaboratory (Moss & Older, 1996) , or from published norms (Postman & Keppel, 1970) .
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randomly interspersed with filler pairs, consisting of a mixture of phonologically related and semantically unrelated pairs, semantically related nonsynonym pairs, and unrelated pairs. A booklet was constructed, containing all of the test and filler pairs. After each pair, there was a rating scale of 1 (very unrelated)-9 (very related). Subjects were instructed to read each pair carefully and give it a rating of 1-9, depending on how semantically related they considered each pair to be. They were encouraged to make their decision as rapidly as possible. Fifteen subjects (aged 19-32 years) were tested. The mean rating for the abstract synonyms was 6.92, for concrete synonyms 7.24, for phonologically related pairs 1.68, for semantically related pairs 5.33, and for completely unrelated pairs 1.37. These results established that subjects were performing the task correctly, as the semantically related pairs were given much higher ratings than the unrelated pairs.
Test Items. We selected 40 pairs of abstract words and 40 pairs of concrete words, matched across the sets for semantic relatedness. Within each set, half thepairs were associated (association strength greater than 20%; Moss & Older, 1996) and half were nonassociated (association strength less than 10%). Since the second member of each of the pairs was to act as thetarget word in a priming study, we also matched the targets across the sets on concreteness, familiarity, frequency 7 , word length, and number of syllables (see Table 1 ). Each test pair was paired with an unrelated control prime to act as a baseline for lexical decision. Unrelated primes were produced by re-pairing each target with another prime, from the same condition, which was semantically and associatively unrelated to the target. The syllable length, frequency, familiarity, and concreteness of the control prime was matched to that of the test prime.
To avoid repetition of the target, the materials were split into two versions. Each version contained half the targets preceded by a related prime and half preceded by an unrelated prime. The test items in each condition were divided into two so that the items within each version were matched in terms of mean semantic relatedness, association strength and target frequency, familiarity, concreteness, and syllable number.
Filler Items. To reduce the proportion of related word pairs within a version to approximately 25%(of real words), we included 80 semantically and associatively unrelated word/word filler pairs. The filler targets matched the syllable length of the test targets. Half of the fillers were nouns and the other half consisted of a mixture of verbs and adjectives; half were concrete words and half abstract. The same filler items were used in both versions.
The test, control, and word/word filler items produced 160 real word pairs in each version. We added 160 word/nonword fillers to each version to make an equal proportion of word and nonword targets. The primes and targets in the word/nonword pairs contained the same proportion of syllable lengths as the test, control, and filler items. The relatedness proportion was thus reduced to 12.5% across the entire set of real words and nonword targets.
The order of presentation was randomised within a version. Across the two versions the test primes appeared in the same position as their controls. Randomisation was carried out for each version within 10 blocks of items, each block containing one test and one control item for each of the 4 conditions, 8 word/word filler items and 16 word/nonword filler items. This ensured that the test and control items were well distributed throughout the word and nonword filler items. Thirty practice pairs were constructed; half were word/word pairs and half were word/nonword pairs. Aquarter of the word/word pairs were semantically related. The practice items contained the same proportion of syllable lengths as the nonpractice items.
The materials were recorded by a female native British English speaker, and digitised onto computer hard disk at a sampling rate of 20kHz. The experiment was controlled by the computer, which played the speech token out directly from the stored wave forms, and registered subjects' responses.
Procedure
Each trial consisted of a spoken pair of words separated by an interstimulus interval of 200msec. Subjects made a lexical decision to the second (target) item in the pair. Lexical decision responses were measured from the onset of the target word.
Subjects
We tested a group of six elderly subjects (aged between 60-70 years). The controls and patient were tested in the same way; on both versions of the priming materials, with one month separating the two testing sessions. The same subjects also participated in the visual priming experiment, 2 months after completing the auditory priming study.
Results and Discussion
Elderly Controls. Each elderly control subject's datawas cleaned individually, in just the same way as we cleaned DrO's data. We removed RTs where the subject had made a lexical decision error (mean lexical decision errors over group = 0.9%; range: 0-3.1%) and then removed the corresponding test or control data point for the same item. We replaced all extreme values (calculated as above or below the overall mean + /-2 SDs) with the cutoff values. Each subject's cleaned data file was combined with that of the other subjects and group statistics were computed (see Table 2 ).
The elderly controls showed a main effect of priming [MinF¢ (1,7) = 15.45, P < .001], with test RTs being faster (772msec) than control RTs (869msec). The priming effect of 105msec for concrete words (range: 33-213msec; 4-21% 8 ) was not significantly greater than the 88msec priming effect (range: 29-144msec; 4-15%) for abstract words (F 1 < 1; F 2 < 1) 9 . Separate analyses 8 We provide proportion of priming (control-test RT/control RT) in addition to raw differences to present priming effects independent of absolute RT. 9 Degree of normative association did not interact with priming.
carried out on the abstract words showed a significant effect of priming [MinF¢ (1,9) = 12.18, P < .01], as did the separate analysis carried out on concrete words [MinF¢ (1,7) = 9.12, P < .01].
DrO. Lexical decision errors (7.5%) were initially removed from the data set and the corresponding test or control item was also removed. Of the remaining data, 5.5% were slower than the mean + 2 SDs and were replaced by that value. DrO's mean RTs and error rates 10 are given in Table 2 11 . Analyses on the RTs showed a main effect of priming [F(1,56) = 20.8, P < .001], with test RTs significantly faster (1103msec) than control RTs (1363msec). There was also a significant interaction between priming and imageability [F(1,56) = 5.05, P < .05], due to a smaller priming effect for the abstract words (133msec; 10%) compared to the concrete words (386msec; 26%). Separate analyses computed on the abstract words alone did not show a significant effect of priming [F(1,28) = 2.8, P = .105], whereas the concrete words, when analysed separately, did show significant priming [F(1,28) = 22.15, P < .001]. RT (seeChertkow et al., 1989) 10 Error analyses showed that there was no significant difference in the error rates for test and control in the abstract and concrete sets. The chi-square values were not significant in either case.
---------------------
11 80% of DrO's data remained after these procedures, and were included in the analyses.
DrO's concrete word priming is very large (26%), although it is only slightly outside the normal range (4-21%). It is unlikely to be an example of hyperpriming since his RTs in the primed condition are not unusually fast compared to those in the primed abstract word condition (Chertkow, Bub, & Seidenberg, 1989) . However, it might reflect DrO's strategic use of semantic context. Given that his RTs are slow, there is more opportunity fortheuse of strategic processes not normally used in this task.
DrO differs from the pattern shown by the elderly controls in not showing a significant priming effect for the abstract words 12 . To be fully confident that his results are not normal, we needed to determine whether any single elderly control subject showed the same pattern. We analysed each subject's data individually, and in the same way as we had analysed DrO's. Five out of the six subjects showed no significant interaction between priming and imageability. Although the sixth subject did show a significant interaction, this was due to more priming for abstract than concrete words. Thus, no subject showed the same results as DrO, and we can be confident that his priming pattern is outside the normal range.
To compare DrO's priming data directly with his performance on more standard off-line tests, we subsequently used the same materials in a semantic relatedness task. Subjects heard the original priming tapes, but instead of making a lexical decision response to the second member of the pair, they indicated whether or not the pairs were semantically related. DrO made 10% errors on concrete words; seven out of the eight control subjects made no errors at all on concrete words and the eighth subject made only one error. DrO made 28% errors on abstract words 13 ; control errors ranged from 0-10% (4%). Similarly, whentested onthe word-picture matching task developed by Shallice and McGill (personal communication) , he made 23% errors on abstract words and 7% on concrete words when the words were presented auditorily.
These results support Franklin, Turner, et al.'s (1994) claim that DrO has problems with abstract words when they are presented in the auditory modality, and show in addition that his problem is not just restricted to the controlled, voluntary access to the meaning of abstract words, but also extends to their automatic activation. If his deficit is modality-specific, we do not expect him to show the same pattern when abstract words are presented in the visual modality; both abstract and concrete words should prime. To test this possibility, we ran a visual version of the auditory priming study. 12 We found exactly the same pattern in a second priming experiment, contrasting a different set of abstract and concrete words. He showed no priming for the abstract word-pairs (mean priming effect: 38msec; F < 1) butsignificant priming for the concrete pairs [mean priming effect: 87msec; F(1.32) = 4.6, P < .05].
13 However, many of these errors were not, in fact, judgement errors; they consisted of DrO saying that he did not know the meaning of the word (for 16.3% of the items).
Visual Semantic Priming Study
In all respects except presentation modality this experiment was identical to the original priming study. In thevisual version, each prime appeared inlower-case on a computer screen for 500msec and then disappeared. The target word (in upper-case letters) immediately appeared for 500msec directly below where the prime had been 14 . Subjects made a lexical decision to the second item in the pair.
We tested the same six elderly control subjects as we had used in the original priming study to provide the appropriate comparison with DrO. Each control subject, and DrO, were tested in the same way; that is, they encountered both versions of the materials, with about a month separating each test session.
Results and Discussion
The data were cleaned in the same way as in the auditory priming experiment. The control subjects made a total of nine lexical decision errors 15 , and 3.5% of the data consisted of extreme values and were replaced by the cutoff values (mean + /-2 SDs). Although the control subjects' RTs were generally faster in the visual experiment (mean: 611msec) compared to the auditory experiment (mean: 820msec), the results were essentially the same (see Table  3 ). Test RTs were significantly faster (mean: 591msec) than control RTs [mean: 635msec; MinF¢ (1,21) = 25.46, P < .01]. The interaction between priming and imageability was not significant [MinF¢ (1,21) = 2.94, P = .09], although there was a trend towards more priming for concrete (mean priming = 59msec) than abstract pairs (30msec). When the abstract set alone were analysed, there was a significant priming effect [MinF¢ (1,16) = 5.47, P < .05], as there was when the concrete set alone were analysed [MinF¢ (1,24) = 24.46, P < .01].
DrO's data was cleaned in the same way as described in the first experiment. He made a total of 1.7% lexical decision errors 16 . His priming effects were similar to those of the elderly controls (see Table 3 ). He showed a significant priming effect [F(1,62) = 4.0, P < .05], with RTs to test items faster (680msec) than those to control items (707msec). Priming did not significantly vary as a function of imageability (F < 1). The mean amount of priming for the abstract words was 17msec, and for the concrete words it was slightly, but not signifi- 14 We chose a presentation duration of 500msec after determining that this was the fastest comfortable reading time for DrO. Another consideration was that the primes and targets could be displayed sufficiently rapidly so as to minimise strategic effects in the priming study. 15 Elderly subjects' lexical decision errors ranged from 0-2%. 16 A total of 12.5% of his data was either removed because they were extreme outliers, or because they were the corresponding data points to those which had incurred lexical decision errors.
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cantly, larger (35msec). Each control subject's data, when analysed separately, showed a main effect of priming, and no difference in the amount of priming for the abstract and concrete words; for each subject the interaction between priming and abstract/concrete was not significant. Thus, each control subject and DrO perform in the same way on the visual priming experiment in showing significant priming for both concrete and abstract words. His normal performance in the visual priming study was mirrored in his accuracy when making semantic relatedness judgements to pairs of visually presented words. His error rate was within the normal range (3%errors on both the abstract and concrete words).
Taking the results of the auditory and visual priming experiments together, we see that in both off-line and on-line tasks, DrO shows same pattern; more problems with abstract thanconcretewords, but only when abstract words occur in the auditory modality. The fact that he can access the meanings of abstract words in the visual modality-whether tested in on-line or off-line tasks (see also Franklin, Turner, et al., 1994 )-suggests that their meaning representation is unimpaired. Thus, DrO's problem seems to be one of modality-specific access to the semantic representations of abstract words. In the next section we will consider whether this is the only interpretation of the data, or whether, when we take into account the temporal properties of spoken word recognition, other accounts are more plausible. Chertkow et al., 1989) CATEGORY-SPECIFIC ACCESS DEFICIT VS.
GENERAL AUDITORY DEFICIT?
Does DrO have a category-specific access deficit or a general impairment in processing spoken inputs? Aspects of the auditory priming suggest that his impairment is general rather than category-specific. They indicate that he has a general auditory processing problem, which affects both concrete and abstract words but has a greater effect on abstract words. We will first of all give our reasons for claiming that DrO has a general auditory processing deficit, and then turn to an account of why this should have a more profound effect on abstract than concrete words.
Slow Auditory Lexical Decision RTs
DrO's lexical decision RTs in theauditory modality were markedly slower than those of the controls. His mean RT (1233msec) in the auditory priming study averaged 413msec slower than the mean for the controls (820msec) and was far outside the normal range (703-904msec). In contrast, his average RT (693msec) was almost within the normal range and only 82msec slower than the control average in the visual priming study (mean: 611msec; range: 567-668msec). Comparing DrO to the slowest control subject in the auditory priming study, we see that he is 329msec slower, whereas he is only 25msec slower than the slowest subject in the visual priming study. When we compare each subject's RTs on the two priming studies, we find a much larger difference between DrO's RTs than those of the controls. DrO's RTs are 540msec slower in the auditory compared to the visual study, whereas the controls range from 117-269msec slower on the auditory experiment.
Clearly, his slow RTs in the auditory modality cannot be due to a general slowing of responses, as his visual RTs are only just outside the normal range. Moreover, his RTs on a simple RT task were normal. In this task, DrO listened over headphones to a sequence of tones and was asked to press a response key as soon as he heard a tone. The tone occurred at unpredictable intervals. His mean tone detection RT was 290msec, which was within the range (154-379msec) produced by a group of elderly controls (Tyler, 1992) . Thus, speed of processing per se is not impaired; this cannot be the explanation for his slow lexical decision responses in the auditory priming study.
Another possible account of his slow lexical decision RTs is that his lexical processing of target words was disrupted by the presence of a prior word in the paired lexical decision paradigm. This seemed a reasonable hypothesis, given that Franklin, Turner, et al. (1994) had reported normal lexical decision performance when DrO was tested on a single word lexical decision experiment. We thus decided to use the targets from the original paired priming study in a single word lexical decision paradigm tosee whetherDrO's lexical decision latencies were any faster than in the paired priming study.
Single Word Lexical Decision Experiment
For this experiment, we constructed a list of real words and nonwords. The real words consisted of 40 test and 40 filler items. The test items consisted of half of the targets from the priming experiment described earlier. Twenty of these words were abstract and 20 were concrete. These real words were pseudorandomly interspersed with 80 nonwords. The nonwords were created by changing one phoneme of a real word. The test list was preceded by a short practice list of mixed words and nonwords.
The list was recorded by a native speaker of British English. There was a 2.5sec ISI between each item. Timing pulses were placed on the nonspeech channel of the tape, at the onset of each test item. Subjects were instructed to listen to the tape carefully and to press one response button if an item was a word and a second button if an item was a nonword.
We tested six elderly control subjects from our subject pool. Their ages ranged from 60-70 years.
Results and Discussion
The mean real word lexical decision RT of the control subjects ranged from 673-1024msec (mean: 882msec). This was 61msec slower than the mean RT in the auditory priming study (821msec). DrO's mean RT for real words in the single word lexical decision experiment was 1257msec, compared with his mean RT of 1233msec to the real words in the auditory priming study. Both DrO and the controls produce comparable RTs in both the paired and single word lexical decision experiments, with DrO's lexical decision RTs being considerably slower than those of the controls in both studies. Thus, DrO's slow RTs in the paired priming study were not peculiar to the paired presentation paradigm. We conclude either that DrO's processing of spoken words is slower than normal, or that his decision time to make a lexical decision response is abnormally slow. We can exclude the second possibility on the grounds that DrO was not slow to make lexical decision responses in the visual modality.
The other important result in the single word lexical decision experiment hinges on the difference between DrO's lexical decision latencies to real words and nonwords. His mean RT to real words (1257msec) was 101msec slower than his mean RT to nonwords (1156msec). This difference was significant [F(1,106) = 4.7, P = .032]. In contrast, each of the control subjects was faster to make a lexical decision to the real words (mean: 846msec; range: 658-992msec)than tothenonwords (mean: 1041msec; range: 959-1227msec).
Across the group, this difference was significant [MinF ¢ (1,18) = 34.48, P <
.001]. Thus, DrO does not seem to be slowed down when responding to a nonword in the way that normal controls are.
Lexical Decision Error Rates
DrO makes more lexical decision errors than any of the controls in the auditory priming study. He made 7.5% lexical decision errors on real words and 5.3% on nonwords. In contrast, only three of the control subjects made any errors at all, with the remaining subjects making between 0.6-3% on real words. However, DrO's error rates are within the range for the visual experiment. He made 1.9% errors on the real words and 5% on the nonwords; the control subjects' errors ranged from 0-2.5% on real words and 0-6.2% on nonwords.
Problems with Concrete Words
There are indications that DrO has some difficulty with concrete, as well as abstract, words in the auditory modality, but not in the visual modality. When presented with spoken words, his lexical decision RTs to concrete words are slow and error-prone (6.3% errors), just as they are for abstract words. In addition, he makes more errors on concrete words in the auditory compared to the visual modality on both semantic relatedness judgements (10%errors in the auditory modality and 3% in the visual modality) and on the Shallice and McGill (personal communication) word-picture matching task (auditory = 7% errors; visual = 0 errors). Finally, he showed abnormally large semantic priming effects for concrete words. Since this was accompanied by significantly slower RTs, the priming effects might reflect the use of strategic processes in recognising spoken words. If DrO does indeed have a generalised auditory processing deficit, he may be taking advantage of the semantics of the concrete prime to compensate for a degraded acoustic input.
TESTS OF GENERAL AUDITORY IMPAIRMENT HYPOTHESIS Phoneme Discrimination Test
We tested DrO's ability to discriminate single feature contrasts in real words by giving him a phoneme discrimination test. In this test (see Tyler, 1992 , for details) patients make same/different judgements about pairs of words that differ by a single feature. We used a wide range of single feature contrasts that occurred both word-initially and word-finally. Consonant contrasts involved changes in place or voice. Place contrasts included voiced and voiceless plosives, voiced and voiceless fricatives and nasals; voice contrasts included voiced and voiceless plosives and fricatives. We also included a set of vowel contrasts. DrO made many errors on pairs where the feature differences involved consonants. He made an average of 15% errors on consonants in word-initial position and 7% on word-final consonants (compared to 5% on word-initial and 4%on word-final consonants for control subjects who did not suffer from hearing loss [Tyler, 1992] ). Errors on consonants in word-final position were confined only to the set of place contrasts (19%). He was quite accurate at discriminating vowel contrasts, only making an average of 2% errors, which is similar to normal controls (1.85%).
Repetition
If we are correct in arguing that DrO has an auditory processing deficit of some type, then Franklin, Turner, et al.'s (1994) claim that he has normal repetition is puzzling. We would expect that if there is some impairment in activating the appropriate phonological representation on the basis of the speech input, then this should have consequences for his ability to repeat that same word. In fact, DrO's repetition performance seems to be more complicated than originally described.
Repetition Study 1
In a pilot study we constructed a mixed set of 20 abstract and 20 concrete words matched for mean familiarity, frequency, syllable number, and number of letters. When DrO was asked to repeat the words at a comfortable rate, his mean repetition RT (measured from word offset) was 588msec, and he made no errors. This is similar to the result reported by Franklin, Howard, et al. (1994) . When, however, DrO was encouraged to repeat the word as rapidly as possible, his error rate increased dramatically. His mean RT decreased to 418msec and he made 25%errors 17 . Thus, it seems that DrOdoes have difficulty repeating a word that he hears in certain circumstances. The fact that he is so error-prone when he has to repeat the word quickly suggests that the phonological representation of the word may not be sufficiently activated by the time he makes his response. However, when his repetition is delayed, it is more accurate, perhaps indicating that by this later point in time the phonological representation has been sufficiently activated.
Repetition Study 2
We tested DrO on a second repetition study to probe further the nature of his auditory impairment. As discussed previously, Franklin, Turner, et al. (1994) attribute his deficit to impaired mapping between an intact word-form representation and an intact semantic representation. Although the appropriate phonological representation can be constructed, there is a problem in mapping from this onto the semantics of an abstract word. This account predicts that DrO's nonword repetition should be accurate, since it can be driven off the form-based representation. However, in those cases where repetition is affected by semantics, he should perform very poorly. We have recently shown, with unimpaired subjects, that real word repetition latencies are, in some circumstances, affected by a word's meaning (Tyler, Voice, & Moss, 1996) . This occurs when a spoken word is a member of a large cohort of competitors (Marslen-Wilson, 1990 , 1993 Marslen-Wilson & Welsh, 1978) , so that it is difficult to discriminate the word from its competitors. Under these conditions, we find an imageability effect in repetition; subjects are faster torepeat concrete than abstract words. In contrast, there is no imageability effect for words in small cohorts (Tyler et al., 1996) . If, as we claim, DrO has a general auditory impairment, we would expect his repetition RTs, while being slower than normal, still to be affected by semantic variables. In addition, we predict that he would make many errors in repeating nonwords. To test these hypotheses we ran DrO on the following repetition study.
Materials.
We selected 46 concrete words (imageability and concreteness ratings > 540) and 46 abstract words ( < 400), divided into two equal-sized familiarity bands; high familiarity (familiarity rating > 550) and low familiarity ( < 420). Concrete and abstract words within the same familiarity band were matched as closely as possible in terms of frequency and familiarity 18 , number of syllables, number of phonemes, and phoneme onset (Table 4 ). The words were one-two-syllable nouns. The abstract and concrete words were further subdivided into groups according to whether they were members of large or small cohorts. We defined a large cohort as one in which there were (1) many competitors sharing thesame onset CV or VCV with the stimulus, and (2) many of the cohort members were of higher frequency than the stimulus (see Table  5 ). At the end of the list of words we included a set of 30 pronounceable nonwords in order to compare nonword with real word repetition latencies. Subjects were tested individually and asked to repeat the words at a comfortable rate 19 .
Results and Discussion. For the 11 elderly control subjects, the mean repetition latency (measured from word onset) for abstract words (660msec; range: 353-872msec) was significantly slower than that for concrete words (610msec; range: 320-805msec; F = 10.473, P < .001) for large cohorts. However, there was no significant difference in repetition latency when the words 18 We could not perfectly match the frequencies of the two sets of high-frequency words, but the higher frequency of the abstract words is a conservative solution since it should increase the probability of faster responses to abstract words. 19 We chose a comfortable, as opposed to speeded, repetition rate in this study since DrOfound speeded repetition upsetting, and this study included more items than the pilot study and was longer.
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were members of small cohorts. For these items, there was a mean repetition latency of 640msec for abstract words and 646msec for concrete words (F < 1). This is the same pattern as we obtained in our earlier research with young subjects (Tyler et al., 1996) . We interpreted the significant imageability effect for words in large cohorts as reflecting the influence of semantics on phonology when the mapping from the speech input to semantics is difficult. When a word is a member of a large cohort with many high-frequency competitors, it will be competing with a large number of words, many of which will be more highly activated. Thus, such stimuli will be difficult to discriminate from their competitors. In this case, semantic information will play a larger role in helping the discrimination process. Although DrO's repetition latencies were much slower (1022msec) than those of the controls (range: 337-841msec), he showed the same pattern. Repetition latencies for abstract words in large cohorts were significantly slower (1180msec) than concrete words (1052msec). This difference of 128msec (12%) was significant [F(1,39) = 10.72, P = .002] and within the normal range (2-13%). In contrast, there was no significant difference when Conc: concreteness rating (Coltheart, 1981) ; imag: imageability rating (Coltheart, 1981) ; freq: frequency rating (LOB norms; Johansson & Hofland, 1989) ; syll: syllables; phon: phonemes; fam: familiarity rating (Coltheart, 1981) . the abstract (1129msec) and concrete words (1148msec) were members of small cohorts (F < 1). This is the pattern that we predicted; slower overall RTs but the same differential effect of imageability when it is difficult to discriminate a speech input.
Finally, the controls were slower to repeat a nonword (mean = 703msec; range = 373-947msec) than a real word, whereas DrO's mean nonword RT of 1033msec was faster than his real word repetition latency, replicating studies described earlier in this paper. Moreover, DrO made 75% nonword repetition errors, compared to only 8% real word errors. The controls' error rate on nonwords ranged from 0-17%. The fact that DrO makes so many nonword errors is difficult to explain on the Franklin, Turner, et al. (1994) account of his deficit as nonwords do not require the mapping from phonology to semantics and thus should be unaffected by any problems in that mapping. However, the fact that DrO showed the normal imageability effect for words in large cohorts argues against the deficit being located in the phonology-semantics mapping.
CONCLUSIONS

Nature of DrO's Auditory Impairment
These various sources of data support the claim that DrO is generally impaired in the processing of spoken language. The evidence for this comes from various temporal aspects of processing the speech input: poor performance on the phoneme discrimination test, slow auditory lexical decision and repetition latencies, and the fact that his repetition and lexical decision latencies are faster to nonwords than to real words. In stark comparison, his ability to process visual input is neither slow nor error-prone. We thus conclude that there is some way in which the speech input is not being analysed normally. What can we say about the nature of this deficit? We suggest two possibilities, both of which assume a model of spoken word recognition such as that proposed by MarslenWilson and colleagues (Gaskell & Marslen-Wilson, 1995; Lahiri & MarslenWilson, 1991; Marslen-Wilson & Warren, 1994) . In this model the speech input is initially analysed into a phonetic featural representation. This then maps onto a triplet of phonological, semantic, and syntactic information, without any intermediate symbolic levels of representation.
One hypothesis is that DrO has problems extracting phonetic features from the speech input. This would be consistent with his poor performance on the phoneme discrimination task, where, in spite of not having a hearing impairment, he was unable to discriminate between pairs of words that differed in terms of a single phonetic feature. His level of errors was more similar to those of the elderly controls suffering from severe hearing loss, who made an average of 13% errors on both word-initial and word-final contrasts involving consonants. Another possibility is that DrO's auditory processing is intact in that he is able to extract a featural level of representation, but the mapping from this onto a phonological representation of the word is impaired, perhaps because it takes longer than normal to activate the appropriate phonological representation. We are currently developing experiments to investigate these various possibilities.
An alternate hypothesis is that DrO's initial processing of the speech input is unimpaired, but the phonological representation either develops abnormally slowly or decays more rapidly. Martin and Saffran (1992) have recently proposed rapid decay of phonological representations as an account of their deep dysphasic patient, NC, who also has difficulty processing spoken words, especially abstract words. They explain their patient's more severe problem with spoken abstract words by appealing to Dell's (1986) interactive activation model, in which there is feedback between phonological, lexical, and semantic levels of representation, claiming that semantic feedback stabilises activation of rapidly decaying phonological representations. Assuming that abstract words have less rich semantic representations, they provide less feedback and thus the phonological code of an abstract word is less stable than that of a concrete word. This reveals itself as a selective deficit for abstract words, although in fact the deficit-fast decay of phonological representationsapplies across the board. This account was supported by data showing that NC had difficulty repeating both abstract and concrete words, although abstract words suffered most severely.
Although DrO and NC differ in certain important ways-for example, DrO never makes semantic errors in repetition whereas NC does-NC shows the same pattern in repetition as DrO. The question is, can DrO's deficit be attributed to the fast decay of a normally constructed phonological representation? We suspect that it cannot, given that DrO makes more errors when he responds rapidly to a spoken word compared to when he responds at a more comfortable speed. When he makes a speeded repetition, his response is closer in time to the speech that he is hearing. If the phonological representation is decaying rapidly, we would expect that a response which is closer in time to the construction of that phonological representation would be more accurate. Thus, speeded repetition should be more accurate than delayed repetition, whereas the reverse actually occurs. The observed pattern of greater repetition accuracy when the response is delayed is more consistent with a slow activation account, where the problem is located in the speed with which a phonological representation is initially constructed. However, this issue clearly requires further investigation.
Why Abstract Words?
But why should an auditory processing impairment affect spoken abstract words more than concrete words? One possibility is that abstract and concrete words differ in their semantic representations. One way of capturing the difference is in terms of number of semantic features, as Martin and Saffran (1992) and Plaut and Shallice (1993) have suggested. Although Breedin et al. (1994) have pointed out some of the ways in which this account is unsatisfying, it provides one of the few opportunities to account for processing differences between abstract and concrete words. DrO's problems with abstract words could thus be attributed to the joint product of slow or impaired access to the appropriate phonological representation, coupled with a lower level of activation from the less rich semantic representation of an abstract word. Although contacting the phonological representation of a concrete word may be impaired or slowed in the same way, its semantic representation will be more highly activated because of its richer semantic representation, possibly due to the activation of larger numbers of semantic features, as Martin and Saffran and Plaut and Shallice suggest. The net result will be impaired performance on both abstract and concrete words, when they are spoken, with more severe problems for abstract words.
A Category-specific Deficit?
The results we have reported here suggest that DrO has a general auditory processing impairment that affects both concrete and abstract words, but has a greater impact on abstract words. We believe that this is less compatible with the view that his problems with abstract words are due to a category-specific access deficit, and more consistent with recent computational approaches that do not assume a qualitative distinction between abstract and concrete words (e.g. Plaut & Shallice, 1993) . It is hard to see how, on a category-specific account, a generalised auditory processing deficit would affect abstract more than concrete words. On such an account, abstract and concrete words are separately represented; there is no basis for assuming that impairments in auditory processing, such that the input representation is nonoptimal in some way, should have differential effects on the two word-types.
In contrast, an auditory analogue of Plaut and Shallice's (1993) recent model can accommodate these results without any difficulty. On this model, the semantic representations of abstract and concrete words only differ in terms of number of semantic features, with concrete words having more features than abstract words. This has theconsequence that more effective basins of attraction develop for concrete than abstract words. Thus, when the input is noisy, the attractor basins for concrete words can still pull the input into the correct basin, whereas this is less likely to be the case for the shallower abstract word basins. What this means is that with a noisy input it is more difficult to activate the correct semantics of an abstract word than a concrete word.
It is unlikely that Plaut and Shallice's account is more than a demonstration that the differences between abstract and concrete words can be represented without assuming that they belong to functionally and anatomically distinct categories. It is implausible that the very primitive semantic distinctions that they draw will turn out to be adequate for capturing the differences between abstract and concrete words. However, in the absence of linguistic theories that articulate the distinctions in sufficient detail, Plaut and Shallice's model remains one of the few useful accounts of the differences between abstract and concrete words.
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